Analytic Theology as Declarative Theology by Arcadi, James M.
2017 TheoLogica 
An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v1i1.73  
37 
 
 
Analytic Theology as Declarative Theology 
 
JAMES M. ARCADI 
Fuller Theological Seminary 
jamesarcadi@fuller.edu  
 
Abstract: Analytic theology seeks to utilize conceptual tools and resources from 
contemporary analytic philosophy for ends that are properly theological. As a 
theological methodology relatively new movement in the academic world, this 
novelty might render it illegitimate. However, I argue that there is much in the 
recent analytic theological literature that can find a methodological antecedent 
championed in the fourteenth century known as declarative theology. In 
distinction from deductive theology—which seeks to extend the conclusions of 
theology beyond the articles of faith—declarative theology strives to make 
arguments for the articles of faith. It does it not to provoke epistemic assent to the 
truth of the articles, but serves as a means of faith seeking understanding. In this 
paper, examples are drawn from recent analytic discussions to illustrate the 
manner that analytic theology has been, is, and can be an instance of declarative 
theology, and thus a legitimate theological enterprise for today. 
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Analytic theology is a recent movement at the nexus of theology and philosophy that 
aims to utilize the tools, methods, and conceptual resources of contemporary analytic 
philosophy for the purpose of constructive theology. In light of this novelty, one might 
aver that it is a sui generis methodology that renders it illegitimate as a mode of Christian 
theological reflection. 1 However, despite the novelty of the name ‘analytic theology’, I 
here argue that one way of practicing analytic theology is to see it as a modern 
instantiation of the category ‘declarative theology’, which was the subject of much 
analysis by Christian theologians of the fourteenth century. By demonstrating that 
analytic theology has a methodological antecedent in a mode of theologizing that is 
                                                                
1 Although I see no objection to this methodology bring utilized by practitioners of a variety of religious 
traditions, much of the recent work and my own theological perspective fall within the Christian 
theological tradition. 
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squarely within the bounds of standard conceptions of Christian theological reflection, I 
render the claim that it is illegitimate on this score unsound.  
In this article, I will first introduce declarative theology by way of a distinction 
made in the medieval period between declarative and deductive theology. Although 
these categories are not ultimately mutually exclusive, I show how analytic theology—
as recently manifested in the literature—achieves the same theological teloi as was 
pursued by practitioners of declarative theology. From here, I show how analytic 
theology can, has, and should operate in the declarative mode. If, then, analytic theology 
pursues and achieves the same ends as a venerable and legitimate methodological 
antecedent, then it too ought to be considered a legitimate theological methodology.  
 
Declarative theology 
 
A distinction made and discussed by the likes of Durandus of St.-Pourçain, Peter 
Aureoli, Godfrey of Fontains, Gregory of Rimini, and Peter of Candia is between 
declarative theology and deductive theology.2 Both types of theology refer to the manner 
of argumentation that is proper to theological discourse. I first here introduce definitions 
for these types of theology and then unpack them further. Durandus offers this 
definition of declarative theology. It is, ‘a lasting quality of the soul by means of which 
the faith and those things handed down in Sacred Scripture are defended and clarified 
by using principles that we know better’ (Brown 2009, 405). Those things we ‘know 
better’ might be a priori principles, empirical observations, or notions derived from 
simple metaphysical or logical principles. Deductive theology, on the other hand, is ‘a 
lasting quality of the soul by means of which it deduces further things from the articles 
of faith and the sayings of Sacred Scripture in the way that conclusions are deduced 
from principles’(Brown 2009, 406). Both types of theology focus on the teaching of 
Scripture and the articles of faith, but they differ with respect to where those 
components fit into theological arguments. By ‘articles of faith’ I take it that these 
theologians mean the first principles of the Christian religion as contained in Scripture, 
the Creed, and/or other authoritative sources of theological reflection. 3  These first 
principles would include such propositions as that God exists, that God is triune, that Jesus 
Christ is God and a human, that God the Father Almighty is maker of heaven and earth, etc.  
                                                                
2 In the historical material of this section, I largely follow the analysis of Stephen F. Brown. 
3 I include the last clause because I take it that these fourteenth-century theologians held the teachings of 
the Roman Catholic magisterium to be a locus of Christian first principles as well as Scripture and the 
Creed. However, I do not think that the methodology of declarative theology need take a position on just 
what the first principles are or where they are found. Thus, it can be utilized by Christian theologians of a 
variety of traditions. 
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For deductive theology, first principle propositions serve as premises in a 
theological argument wherein the conclusion is an extension of the content of theology. 
For example, a deductive theologian could perhaps make the following argument: 
 
(1) God is indivisible. 
(2) Anything composed of parts is divisible. 
∴ (3) God is not composed of parts. 
 
This is just a rough argument for something like the doctrine of divine simplicity, but it 
is here only to illustrate the methodology. Arguably, premise (1) is a first principle 
contained in Scripture (perhaps one could point to the Shema, ‘Here O Israel: the Lord 
our God, the Lord is one’ [Deut. 6.4], as an expression of this premise). Premise (2) is 
derived from metaphysical reflection. The conjunction of (1) and (2) yields (3) that God 
is not composed of parts. That God is not composed of parts is not stated explicitly in 
Scripture or in the Creed. But the deductive theologian beginning with the first principle 
regarding God’s unity, and then in adding another premise, deduces a theological 
conclusion from an article of faith.  
In distinction from deductive theology, according to Durandus, declarative 
theology inserts the first principle propositions as conclusions in theological arguments. 
For example, this procedure might look something like this: 
 
(4) Any division of an entity diminishes that entity. 
(5) God cannot be diminished. 
∴ (6) God is indivisible. 
 
In this argument, the conclusion (6) is the same proposition as premise (1) of the 
preceding argument. In both, the proposition that God is indivisible is a first principle—an 
article of faith—derived from Scripture ex hypothesi. In the deductive theology example 
this proposition functions as a premise in an argument for something like a doctrine of 
divine simplicity. In the declarative theology instance, this proposition is the conclusion 
of the argument. Hence, the distinction might be characterized as deductive theology 
argues from the first principles, whereas declarative theology argues to the first 
principles. 
However, it must be stressed that declarative theological arguments are not 
intended to establish epistemic assent to the first principles. Aureoli, an archetypal 
defender of declarative theology, is explicit that assent is due to faith alone, and faith is 
a gift from God. One believes that God is triune because one has the gift of faith, and this 
is the case for the professional theologian and non-theologian alike. Thus, in describing 
the habit of theology, Aureoli says, ‘Every habit that makes something to be imagined 
better by the intellect without producing any assent is a declarative habit’ (Brown 2009, 
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414, emphasis added). This theological practice does not produce assent to the truth of 
the article of faith, for that would make one’s faith dependent on the argument. 
However, the argument serves to help the possessor of faith to ‘imagine better’ that 
which that person already believes by faith.  
If one already believed the propositions of the articles of the faith by faith, then it 
might seem that arguments made within a declarative theology mode would be 
superfluous. In order to show why the possessor of faith would benefit from theological 
arguments of this kind, in his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences Aureoli entertains 
four ways that one who had faith might misunderstand that which one believes. First, 
one might not understand the meaning of the terms used in an article of faith. For 
instance, the proposition that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures would be difficult 
to understand if one only had a rudimentary grasp of key terms such as ‘person’ or 
‘natures’. Secondly, Aureoli imagines one who believes the articles of faith, but also 
comes across arguments against the faith that produce confusion in this one’s mind. For 
example, suppose someone affirmed the truth of the proposition that Jesus Christ is one 
person with two natures as it is formulated in the ‘Definition’ of Chalcedon. But then 
suppose that person was presented with the following argument: 
 
(7) All persons are instance of one and only one nature. 
(8) Jesus Christ is a person. 
∴ (9) Jesus Christ is an instance of one and only one nature. 
 
Clearly, (9) contradicts the article of faith that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures. A 
person might still assent to the truth of that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures, but 
in light of the above argument they might hold that proposition with less confidence or 
be in a state of confusion. Declarative theology could, among other things, press on 
premise (7) to find it the weak point in the argument, and thus contribute to restoring 
the confidence of the person who affirmed the article of faith that Christ has two 
natures. Thirdly, Aureoli continues, one might misunderstand the articles of faith 
because one ‘lacks examples, confirming arguments, or analogies related to’ belief 
(Brown 2009, 414). Fourthly, and finally, one might misunderstand because she does not 
have probable arguments to support or confirm what she already believes. The 
declarative theologian seeks to dispel these inhibitors to understanding. The result will 
be a theological methodology that ‘makes the believer imagine in a better and clearer 
way the things he believes, and yet it will not be what makes him believe, since he most 
firmly would already hold these things by faith’ (Brown 2009, 415). The arguments of 
declarative theology are not intended to establish or create faith, rather they are 
intended to enable the one who already believes the articles of faith to do so with greater 
confidence and clarity.  
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Now, two quick caveats before proceeding. First, I put my examples of 
theological arguments in syllogism form purely for illustrative purposes. I do not think 
that syllogistic reasoning is required for either deductive or declarative theology. Recall 
that ‘deductive’ in deductive theology only characterizes that one deduces further 
notions from the articles of faith, not that one only uses deductive logic. One can 
certainly use non-syllogistic forms of argumentation in the service of either deductive or 
declarative theology. Secondly, I do not think that one must be forced into a strict 
bifurcation between deductive and declarative theology. Stephen Brown describes Peter 
of Candia as one who offered a synthesis between these two modes of theologizing 
(Brown 1991, 171-173). Peter of Candia’s simple point is that these are not mutually 
exclusive tasks and theologians are called up on to perform both tasks at different times. 
I am happy to accept this point, and thus accept the utility of deductive theology in 
certain contexts. Thus if analytic theology is an instance of both declarative and 
deductive theology then it ends up with two venerable historical methodological 
antecedents. This then is all the better to block the objection to analytic theology due to 
its apparent novelty. However, I see analytic theology as particularly pursuing the aims 
and objectives of declarative theology. The next section moves to exposit some of the 
aims and methods of analytic theology before the final section draws these two 
approaches to the theological task together with specific illustrations from recent 
analytic discussions. 
 
Analytic theology 
 
Although analytic theology as a named entity is relatively fresh on the theological scene, 
yet I see it as another instance of a longstanding practice within the Christian theological 
tradition of viewing philosophy as a handmaiden to theology.4 From this perspective, 
philosophical reasoning can assist the theologian in the theological task of speaking 
about God and the things of the faith. Whereas in the Church’s past the version of 
philosophy utilized by a particular theologian might have been Aristotelianism or 
Neoplatonism or Phenomenology or others, analytic theology makes use of 
contemporary analytic philosophy as its preferred handmaiden.  
In his An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, Thomas H. McCall likens the 
ambitions and aims of analytic theology to those of analytic philosophy. McCall 
commends as the goal of analytic theology Quentin Smith’s description of Alvin 
Plantinga’s work in that it exemplifies such values as conceptual precision, 
argumentative rigour, and technical sophistication (McCall 2015, 17). Along similar lines 
                                                                
4 The advent of analytic theology as a named entity can be traced to the publication of the edited volume 
Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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of description, Oliver Crisp comments that, like analytic philosophy, the method that 
analytic theology employs will be ‘characterized by a logical rigour, clarity, and 
parsimony of expression’ (Crisp 2009, 35). These characteristics find their fullest 
expression in Michael Rea’s almost canonical prescriptions: 
 
P1. Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately 
formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated. 
P2. Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence. 
P3. Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes whose 
semantic content outstrips their propositional content.  
P4. Work as much as possible with well-understood primitive concepts, and 
conceptus that can be analyzed in terms of those. 
P5. Treat conceptual analysis (insofar as possible) as a source of evidence (Rea 
2009, 5-6). 
 
These stated values and ambitions of analytic theology follow closely on—what might 
be taken to be—standard conceptions of analytic philosophy.  
However, some demur from this ‘rigourist’ explication of analytic theology and 
thus call into question the utility of Rea’s P1-5. For instance, Sarah Coakley comments, 
‘At least some of us, in fact, also seek to enrich, compensate for, and sometimes 
significantly question the relentless urge of classic analytic philosophy to pure 
propositional clarity; and we do so by calling on insights drawn from different realms of 
philosophical discourse, or from other more strictly theological and revelatory sources’ 
(Coakley 2013, 603). Coakley calls for an opening up of the horizons of analytic 
philosophy, and thus analytic theology with it. She urges that the analytic theologians 
should feel empowered by—not restricted by—the analytic methodology. 
In a similar vein, William J. Abraham has offered something of a more 
deflationary account of analytic theology. He sees it as simply a way of doing systematic 
theology, ‘By analytic theology I mean here systematic theology attuned to the skills, 
resources, and virtues of analytic philosophy, broadly conceived’ (Abraham 2009, 54). In 
this regard, the subject matter of analytic theology is that of standard Christian 
systematic theology: God and the teaching of Christianity as they are found in 
revelation and the historical teaching of the church. Yet, the manner in which one 
approaches this task will, then, end up being as diverse as the many instances of 
analytic philosophy and thus may not fall as neatly into Rea’s P1-P5. 
Nevertheless, one of the hallmarks of analytic approaches—like the scholastic 
approaches before them and in distinction from much contemporary work in Christian 
theology—is attentiveness to argumentation. Analytics trade in presenting, analysing, 
defeating, and interacting with arguments. Given this description of the ambitions and 
aims of analytic theology, I contend that analytic theology is uniquely positioned to be 
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able to carry on the tradition of declarative theology as exposited in the previous 
section. In fact, what I will show in the next section is that analytic theologians have 
already been orienting their work around the four motives for declarative theology that 
Peter Aureoli outlines in his Sentences commentary. This does not entail that analytic 
theology is the only or even the best mode for theologizing today, but it does show that 
analytic theology has a legitimizing methodological ancestor in declarative theology. 
 
Analytic theology as declarative theology 
 
Recall that Peter Aureoli delineated four ways that the faithful could falter in their 
embrace of the articles of faith, and the alleviation of these are four teloi of declarative 
theology. The faithful might (a) not understand the terms utilized in the articles, (b) 
come across defeaters to their belief in the articles, (c) lack examples or analogies, and 
(d) fail to have probable arguments to support their belief. My argument is that analytic 
theology not only ought to preserve these declarative theology values, but that analytic 
theologians have already been achieving the ends of this methodological antecedent. In 
noting these instances of fulfilling the motives of declarative theology, I also here 
attempt to bring greater clarity to what these motives are and how they might be 
realized.  
 
On the clarification of terms 
 
The articles of the Christian faith are expressed using many technical terms, a fair 
amount of which have much theological and philosophical conceptual underpinning. 
Analytic theology as declarative theology seeks to explicate and explain the meaning of 
these terms and show how they function to express the theological realities they attempt 
to denote. Crisp comments that analytic theology will ‘seek to deal with complex 
doctrinal concerns by dividing them into more manageable units, or focusing on 
providing a clear expression of particular theological terms that inform particular 
doctrines in important respects, for example, “substance”, “perichoresis”, or “person”’ 
(Crisp 2009, 35). Thus, clarification of terms is at the heart of the analytic way. 
One example of this terminological clarification projects occurs in discussions of 
the Incarnation. For instance, when one assents to the truth of the article of faith that 
Jesus Christ is one person with two natures, one might not deeply grasp just what a ‘nature’ 
is in this context. The recent analytic discussion of Christology has provided a way 
forward in explicating this term. A key distinction in the literature is that made by 
Plantinga between concrete and abstract conceptions of natures (Plantinga 1999). 
Abstractists hold that, at bottom, a nature is a property, a rich property, or a cluster of 
properties. Concretists hold that, at bottom, a nature is a concrete particular that bears 
properties. Plantinga puts the distinction this way regarding the abstractist position: 
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when the second person of the Trinity became incarnate and assumed human 
nature, what happened was that he, the second person of the Trinity, acquired 
the property of being human; he acquired whatever property it is that is 
necessary and sufficient for being human (Plantinga 1999, 183). 
  
We might think of a nature on the abstract view as being simply a rich property like, 
being capable of rational thought and being appropriately linked with a human body and being 
capable of intentional action, or whatever components one thought was necessary and 
sufficient for being a member of the natural kind ‘human’. 
In distinction from the abstract-nature view, the concrete-nature perspective 
begins not with properties, but with concrete particulars. Plantinga describes the 
concretist view of natures: 
 
On the second view, by contrast, what he assumed was a human nature, a specific 
human being. What happened when he became incarnate is that he adopted a 
peculiarly close and intimate relation to a certain concrete human being, a 
‘human nature’ in the sense of a human being. That is, there is or was a concrete 
human being—a creature, and a creature with will and intellect—to whom the 
Logos became related in an especially intimate way, a way denoted by the term 
‘assumption’ (Plantinga 1999, 183-184). 
 
The concretist holds that natures are or are composed of concrete particulars that bear 
properties, but that are not themselves properties. Concrete particulars are not sharable 
by other entities, they cannot be borne by others, rather, the concretist holds with 
Michael Loux that a nature is such that it bears certain necessary properties and is not 
itself a property (Loux 1998, 126-127). 
The distinction between these two views on the nature of natures is really about 
logical priority and starting points. Does one start with properties or with a concrete 
particular? Plantinga offers this comparison of the two views: 
 
the terms ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ get used in two analogically related but 
very different senses: in the first sense [the abstract-nature view], the term 
‘human nature’ denotes a property (or, if you like, group of properties): the 
property P which is such that necessarily, every human being has P, and 
necessarily, whatever has P is a human being. In the second sense [the concrete-
nature view], the thing denoted by ‘human nature’ and that gets assumed is a 
human being, a concrete object, not an abstract object like a property (Plantinga 
1999, 184).  
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This is not the space to settle views as to which perspective on natures is accurate. What 
this subsection does show is that analytic theology can do much with respect to the 
clarification of terms and thus fulfil this goal of declarative theology. 
 
On defeating defeaters 
 
Many of the articles of faith, such as those contained in the Creed or the statements of 
the Ecumenical Councils, were forged in the face of arguments against the faith. 
Whether by outright contradiction of the proposition or by slight—but nevertheless 
heretical—modifications, the articles of faith have long been subject to counter-
argumentation. Analytic theology as declarative theology seeks to meet the objections of 
detractors from the articles of faith so that the faithful might more firmly hold that 
which they believe by faith.  
Consequently, one sphere in which trained to utilize ‘logical rigour’ will be 
especially proficient will be in argumentative analysis (Crisp 2009, 35). Crisp comments 
regarding the right use of reason by Christian theologians is such that: 
 
reason is a tool for establishing the logical connections between different 
propositions, for distinguishing what I am talking about from what I am not, and 
whether what I am saying makes sense, or is incoherent. Such reasoning also 
enables me to consider the validity of a particular argument that is put forward, 
and whether or not it is subject to less obvious defects of reasoning, like question-
begging or affirming the consequent, and so on (Crisp 2009, 41).  
 
Thus, Crisp continues, ‘for the analytic theologian, clarity and precision of 
argumentation, coupled with attention to possible objections to one’s position, will be 
very important considerations’ (Crisp 2009, 44). When an analytic theologian engages 
with arguments against the articles of faith, to find them unsound or invalid, one 
achieves this second motive for declarative theology. 
For instance let us take the exchange between Michael Martin and Katherin 
Rogers in Debating Christian Theism. Martin marshals an argument against Thomas 
Morris’ account of Christology from his The Logic of God Incarnate (Morris 1986). In that 
text Morris argues that: 
  
(10) Christ is one person with two minds. 
 
Each of Christ’s minds correspond to one of the two natures that the ‘Definition’ of 
Chalcedon assigns to him. Martin, however, makes the following argument:  
 
(11) Each person has one and only one mind. 
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(12) Either Jesus Christ is one person with one mind, or two persons with two 
minds (Martin 2013). 
 
Yet, regardless which side of the disjunction in (12) that one embraces, a contradiction is 
derived when combined with (10). Thus, Martin concludes, traditional Christology is 
incoherent.5 Perhaps one who embraced (10) and yet came across Martin’s argument 
might still believe the traditional position that Christ is one person with two natures, but 
they might do so with some uncertainty as to how this might be. Analytic theology as 
declarative theology, as Crisp describes, evaluates whether the claims of coherence or 
incoherence are sound.  
In response to Martin’s argument, and as an instance of declarative theology, 
Katherin Rogers meets the allegation of the incoherence of the Incarnation understood 
as a ‘one person / two natures’ view of Christ (Rogers 2013). She understands the 
Incarnation as a divine action, as God doing something. She uses an extended analogy 
of a state of affairs called ‘Nick Playing’ which involves a boy, ‘Nick’, playing a first-
person video game, he character being denoted as ‘Virtual Nick’. Thus, the Incarnation 
is a state of affairs akin to Nick Playing. Nick Playing being composed of two parts is a 
picture of Christ being composed of divine and human natures. Virtual Nick allows 
Nick to operate in the virtual world, as Christ’s human nature allows the divine Word 
the ability to act in the human sphere. Rogers’ Nick Playing scenario seems to make 
sense of one person possessing two minds. Given the constrains of the virtual world in 
which Virtual Nick dwells, Virtual Nick is only able to have mental experiences within 
that sphere. But, during Nick Playing, Nick is able access both Virtual Nick’s mental 
states and Nick’s own. The mental states of Virtual Nick might not accrue to Nick, or 
only in some derivative sense as when Virtual Nick falls down a Warp Pipe, and Nick 
says, ‘I’m falling down a pipe!’ It is qua-Virtual Nick that Nick is aware of the fall, even 
though Nick in his non-virtual mind, is aware that he is not falling. Yet, the state of 
affairs of Nick Playing includes Nick’s awareness of both mental state via his two 
minds. Rogers’ argument does not establish the necessity of embracing the article of 
faith of Christ’s dual natures, but it at least supports the coherence of this proposition. 
Thus, analytic theologians as declarative theologians will carefully evaluate arguments 
against the articles of faith in order to support faithful’s belief in these articles.  
 
On analogies 
 
This discussion of Rogers’ use of analogy segues to the third goal of declarative 
theology: the deployment of analogies related to the articles of faith. Although there are 
                                                                
5 Of course it should be noted that Martin only calls into question the coherence of Morris’ specific 
explication of traditional Christology. 
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some truths contained in the articles of faith that many theologians have held can be 
assented to on the basis of reason alone (such as that God exists, or that God is one), many 
of the propositions of the articles of faith are only understandable on the basis of divine 
revelation. No one pondering alone without the aid of divine revelation and the gift of 
faith would come to believe that God is triune or that Jesus Christ is God and a human or 
that the bread of the Eucharist is the body of Christ. As such, these propositions are sui 
genesis and have no natural dovetails with phenomena in the natural realm. However, 
that does not mean that theologians cannot strive to explain revealed truths by means of 
certain comparisons with items in the created realm.  
For instance, I have already discussed how Rogers’ used the analogy of a boy 
playing a video game to portray the relation between Christ’s divine and human 
natures. Another metaphor utilized in discussions of Christology—by Brian Leftow and 
Oliver Crisp—is that of conceiving of the human nature of Christ as a garment or scuba 
gear that the divine Word puts on in order to operate in the human realm in a similar 
manner as a diver utilizes a diving suit to operate in the aquatic realm. Crisp states, ‘The 
second person of the Trinity puts on human nature like a garment; he is “clothed” by his 
nature; but he is not identical to it,’ thus ‘The human nature thus assumed is rather like 
an environment suit for God the Son that enables him to act in the world among human 
beings’ (Crisp 2011, 47, 48). One might think that either there is not as deep enough a 
connection between a person and the garment they are wearing to describe the 
Incarnation, or that the connection is such that the divine nature is still contaminated by 
the created realm. However, Leftow thinks this connection might indeed be so captured 
by the analogy. He writes, ‘Scuba gear is intimately connected to the diver’s body. Yet it 
keeps the diver disconnected from the water it touches: scuba gear lets one swim 
without getting one’s feet wet. [The human nature of Christ] is the Son’s environment 
suit, letting him manoeuvre in time yet stay dry’ (Leftow 2002, 292). For the person who 
believes by faith that Jesus Christ is God and a human an analogy of this sort could help the 
faithful imagine better this proposition.  
Now, I offer a brief excursus on this point before proceeding to the final motive 
for seeing analytic theology as declarative theology. For one might think that this third 
motive of declarative theology with respect to the use of analogies contradicts Rea’s P3: 
‘Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes whose semantic 
content outstrips their propositional content’ (Rea 2009, 5). I submit that these values, 
properly explicated, do not contradict one another. For Rea is especially concerned to 
avoid inserting metaphor or story into a theological discourse as though it were an 
argument or premise in itself. That is, instead of pursuing the careful work of clearly 
laying bare the components of one’s argument, the theologian in this case allows a 
metaphor to stand alone as a substantive component to the treatment of the issue. For 
instance, an untoward use of metaphor in a theological argument might be the 
following: 
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(13) Centaurs are half human, half-horse entities. 
(14) Jesus Christ is like that, but with God instead of horse. 
∴ (15) Jesus Christ is God and a human. 
 
Of course, (15) is an article of faith. But it hardly seems that the metaphor of Christ being 
like a Centaur is an argument for (15). This is a substantive and non-decorative use of 
metaphor that Rea recommends analytic theology to avoid. 
However, the analogies that declarative theology deploys are offered to aid in 
understanding of particular article of the faith or in understanding an argument for one 
of these articles. The analytic qua-declarative theologian could, for example, deploy this 
argument/metaphor couplet: 
 
(16) Jesus Christ is one person with a divine nature. 
(17) Jesus Christ is one person with a human nature. 
∴ (18) Jesus Christ is one person with a divine nature and a human nature. 
 
‘What is it like for one person to have two natures? Well, it is sort of like a Centaur who 
has the rational capacities and upper torso of a human, but the legs and body of a horse.’ 
But the theologian would also then need to show how this analogy breaks down. 
Analytic theologian Oliver Crisp actually describes analytic philosophy by 
recourse to an extended analogy:  
 
On one way of characterizing the analytic philosophical project problems are 
broken down into their constituent parts, analysed, and then reformed in an 
argument that attempts to make sense of the original problem. Here the analytic 
philosopher is rather like a mechanic who decides to strip an engine down in 
order to understand why is it making a peculiar rattling sound. He analyses the 
parts of the engine, cleans them up, and then reassembles the machine having 
satisfied himself that he has addressed the problem so that the engine will work 
properly once reformed (Crisp 2009, 36). 
 
In this illustration, the metaphor helps us grasp just what the analytic philosopher is 
doing in her task. Thus the metaphor advances understanding, it does not detract from 
it. Thus, it is not always the case that metaphor or analogy have no place in the clear 
explication of the articles of faith, they simply must be used in the service of the project 
of clarification, not as a substantive arguments for the article. 
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On faith seeking understanding 
 
Finally, Aureoli notes that some might misunderstand the articles of faith because they 
do not have probable arguments to support their faith. Misunderstanding, again, is not 
misbelieving. The articles of faith are believed based on faith, but this side of the 
eschaton we all must have a posture like the man who responded to Jesus in Mark 9, ‘I 
believe, help my unbelief!’ Or, like St. Anselm, we possess faith seeking understanding. 
The articles of faith are not believed on the basis of argumentation, but argumentation 
can help the faithful to solidify or understand that which they already believe.  
In fact, continuing with St. Anselm, this seems to be the posture from which 
Anselm deployed his famous ontological argument for the existence of God.6 Much ink 
has been spilled over whether an argument of the kind will really convince the atheist, 
especially one who is dead-set against Christianity. But the analytic theologian, qua-
declarative theologian, need not worry about this for the declarative theologian is 
writing for the Christian who already embraces the articles of faith.7 This Christian 
already assents to the truth of the proposition that God exists, but—the declarative 
theologian holds—this Christian can embrace that truth with more confidence if she has 
an argument that supports it. 
This in the context in which the analytic theologian can explore and deploy the 
conception of God as that than which nothing greater can be conceived, as an effort of 
faith seeking understanding. As Abraham comments, ‘Clearly Anselm began his 
thinking about God inside the faith. He was not in search of God or in search of a proof 
of God; he already had come to know God for himself in the life of the Church’ 
(Abraham 2009, 62). For Anselm, the ontological argument was a creative exploration of 
the notions of goodness and existence as it pertained to the God he already knew and 
loved. ‘The point’ says philosopher Lenn Goodman, ‘was not to prove God’s existence 
to those who doubted it but to show that that existence follows from God’s perfection’ 
(Goodman 1996, 51). The analytic theologian as declarative theologian, following 
Anselm’s example, would also deploy arguments of like manner to support the faith of 
the faithful. 
Anselm’s argument is well-known, and I only here present it for illustrative 
purposes. I think it can be somewhat simplified into the following form: 
 
                                                                
6 One can also find a contemporary analytic version of the ontological argument, taking its cue from 
Anselm, in Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 213-216. 
7 I do not mean to imply that the ontological argument cannot be deployed in apologetic situations or as a 
defense of the reasonableness of Christianity against the non-Christian. I only indicate that the theologian 
operating in the declarative mode is to support the faith of the faithful. A theologian is certainly free to 
operate in other modes. 
JAMES M. ARCADI 
50 
 
(19) God is the supreme good (i.e., that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived). 
(20) If God is the supreme good, then God exists. 
∴ (21) God exists.8 
 
The crucial move in this argument, as has long been pointed out, is to observe that that 
which is the supreme good necessarily necessarily exists. One can certainly quibble with 
just what key notions like ‘goodness’, ‘existence’, or ‘supreme’ mean in this context. But 
for the Christian who already assents to (21), if the analytic/declarative theologian 
presents (19) and (20), and the Christian sees the reasonableness in these premises, then 
she will have a confirming argument for that which she already believes by faith. Again 
to reiterate Aureoli, an argument like the ontological argument is not employed by the 
declarative theologian to produce faith in (21), rather the declarative theologian seeks to 
help the Christian embrace (21) better and more deeply as faith seeks understanding.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Analytic theology is a relatively new movement in the history of Christian theological 
reflection. Yet this novelty ought not to render it illegitimate, for it has a methodological 
antecedent in the declarative theology championed by the likes of the fourteenth-
century Christian theologian Peter Aureoli. Aureoli discussed declarative theology as a 
motif for theologians to strive for as they help the faithful seek deeper embraces of the 
articles of faith. In this mode of theologizing, the articles of faith function as conclusions 
in theological arguments. The declarative theologian seeks to find premises that support 
these conclusions or they seek to defeat arguments that have positions contrary to the 
articles of faith as their conclusions. As has been demonstrated, analytic theology’s 
proclivity for rigorous analysis of arguments, clarity, and a focus on the terminology 
employed in these arguments make it a worthy heir to this methodological tradition and 
is unique among methodologies on offer in contemporary Christian theology. I contend 
that future analytic theologians should continue this trajectory and thereby help the 
faithful Christian ‘imagine in a better and clearer way the things he believes’ (Brown 
2009, 415).9 
  
                                                                
8 I owe this formulation to Jeffery Brower. 
9 I am grateful for comments on previous drafts to two anonymous reviewers, Oliver Crisp, Jordan 
Wessling, Jesse Gentile, and Christopher Woznicki. 
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